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This note corrects an analytical mistake of Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) in their analysis of
a Stackelberg game of the voluntary contribution to an international best−shot public good by
a donor and a recipient. It shows that, depending on players' preferences, the donor may
choose not to contribute but make a positive direct income transfer to the recipient who will
then contribute to the best−shot public good.
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1. Introduction 
 
Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) study the interaction between international public goods and 
direct foreign aid transfers. They consider a Stackelberg game in which there are two players, the 
donor country and the recipient country, each deriving utility from the consumption of a private 
good and an international public good. The donor is the leader who moves first and divides its 
endowed income into private consumption, contribution to the public good, and direct transfer to 
the recipient. The recipient is the follower who moves second and allocates his total income, the 
sum of its endowed income and the direct income transfer from the donor, between private 
consumption and contribution to the public good.  
  When the technology of public good production, which transfers individual contributions 
to the aggregate public good level, is of the "max" or "best-shot" type, such that the level of 
public good is determined by the larger contribution of the two players (e.g., high-tech research 
and development), Jayaraman and Kanbur state in their Proposition 3 that, "In a Stackelberg 
framework with a best-shot technology and identical agents, the Stackelberg equilibrium will be 
characterized by zero direct income transfers". It is not clear from this statement whether the two 
players or agents have the same income level, although it is quite evident from the context of 
their paper that the donor is richer than the recipient. 
  Unfortunately, the statement is wrong, as this note will show. Indeed, depending on 
players' preferences, the donor may in equilibrium make a positive direct income transfer to the 
recipient, even if the former is no richer than the latter. This result can be most easily understood 
from the following extreme case. Suppose that both the donor and the recipient derive utility 
from only the public good. Given the public good is of best-shot type, it is optimal for the donor, 
regardless of its income level, not to contribute but transfer all its income to the recipient who 
will then devote the sum of the transfer and it own income to the provision of the public good. 
  In Section 2, I analyze the Stackelberg game, as set by Jayaraman and Kanbur, of the 
voluntary contribution to best-shot public goods, and Section 3 summarizes the result. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
There are two players, player 1, the donor country, and player 2, the recipient country. The donor 
is the leader who moves first, and the recipient is the follower who moves second. Player i's, i = 
1, 2, utility is given by 
 
ui = u(xi, G),                              (1)  
 
where xi is the consumption of a private good, and G is the consumption of an international 
public good. Both the private and public goods are normal goods. It is assumed that utility is 
continuous, increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. Player i's income is wi. Jayaraman 
and Kanbur assume that w1 > w2, in light of the fact that the donor is usually a rich country while 
the recipient usually a poor country. In this note, I impose no restrictions on the relative 
magnitude of w1 and w2.  
  The donor moves first and divides its endowed income, w1, into private consumption, x1 
≥ 0, contribution to the public good, g1 ≥ 0, and direct income transfers to the recipient, t ≥ 0. So, 
the budget constraint for the donor is   2
 x 1 + g1 + t = w1.                        (2) 
   
The recipient moves second and allocates its total income, the sum of its endowed 
income, w2, and the transfers, t, received from the donor, into private consumption, x2 ≥ 0, and 
contribution to the public good, g2 ≥ 0. So, the budget constraint for the recipient is 
 
 x 2 + g2 = w2 + t.                                   (3) 
 
The technology of public good production is of "max" or "best-shot" type in that the 
aggregate level of the public good is given by the larger of the two players' contributions. Thus, 
 
 G  =  max{g1, g2}.                        (4) 
   
The fundamental research into the nature and evolution of infectious diseases obeys a max or 
best-shot technology. 
  Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) state in their Proposition 3 that the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is characterized by t = 0. Unfortunately, this statement is incorrect, as I will show 
below. 
The Stackelberg game can be solved by backward deduction. The recipient plays the best 
response to the donor's transfer and contribution levels, and the donor chooses transfer and 
contribution levels to maximize its own utility, taking into account the recipient's best response 
schedule. To solve for the equilibrium, the following observations are useful. First, in 
equilibrium, either g1 > 0 and g2 = 0, or g1 = 0 and g2 > 0. In other words, only one player makes 
contribution to the public good. This observation derives directly from the nature of the max 
technology of public good. The player who contributes less adds nothing to the level of the best-
shot public good but reduces its own private consumption and hence its utility.  
Second, if w2 ≥ w1, then it must be the case that g1 = 0 and g2 > 0. The reason is simple. If 
g1 > 0, then the recipient's best response will be one of the following, g2 = 0 or g2 > g1 > 0 (recall 
that the recipient and donor have identical preferences and that both the private and public goods 
are normal goods). In the latter case, the donor's contribution is wasted. In the former, the donor 
can do better by not contributing, because the recipient will then contribute a larger amount than 
its own contribution. Therefore, when w2 ≥ w 1, the donor's problem is to allocate its income 
between private consumption and income transfers to the recipient. In the analysis below, I focus 
on the case in which the donor is richer than the recipient, w1 > w2.  
Third, if g1 > 0, then t = 0. If the donor chooses to contribute to the best-shot public good, 
it will make no direct income transfers to the recipient. Given the donor's contribution to the 
best-shot public good, any income transfer to the recipient from the donor reduces the donor's 
private consumption and hence its utility.  
  Equipped with the above observations, the analysis of equilibrium of the Stackelberg 
game is straightforward. If the donor is the contributor to the public good, it chooses g1 to 
maximize u(w1 - g1, g1). Let the solution be g1* = f(w1). The assumption that both the private and 
public goods are normal goods implies that 0 < f′(w1) < 1. 
  If the donor does not contribute, but transfers t ≥ 0 to the recipient, the recipient will 
choose g2 to maximize u(w2 + t, g2). The solution is g2* = f(w2 + t). Hence, G = g2*, and the 
donor's utility is u1 = u(w1 - t, g2*). The donor chooses t to maximize its utility. Note that, if 
du1/dt|t = 0 = - ∂u(w1, f(w2))/∂x1 + ∂u(w1, f(w2))/∂G f'(w2) > 0, we must have t > 0. Furthermore,    3
if u1 is concave in t, then the optimal t* is given by ∂u(w1 - t*, f(w2 + t*))/∂x1 = ∂u(w1 - t*, f(w2 + 
t*))/∂G f′(w2 + t*). And the donor's utility is u(w1 - t*, f(w2 + t*)).  
Clearly, if u(w1 - t*, f(w2 + t*)) > u(w1 - f(w1), f(w1)), the donor will choose not to 
contribute but make a positive income transfer to the recipient who will then be the contributor. 
Note that, from the definition of t*, u(w1 - t*, f(w2 + t*)) > u(w1, f(w2)). Thus, sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a positive equilibrium income transfer are u(w1, f(w2)) > u(w1 - 
f(w1), f(w1)) and - ∂u(w1, f(w2))/∂x1 + ∂u(w1, f(w2))/∂G f'(w2) > 0. 
  The result can be intuitively understood in a two-step thought experiment. Suppose first 
that income transfers from the donor to the recipient are prohibited. When a donor decides 
whether or not to contribute, it faces a tradeoff between private and public consumption. If it 
contributes, more of the public good is provided, as the donor is richer than the recipient. But the 
donor's private consumption is reduced by its contribution level. On the other hand, if the donor 
does not contribute, the recipient will contribute a smaller amount of the public good than that if 
the donor were to contribute. But the donor's private consumption will be its endowed income. 
Depending on the utility function, the donor may choose not to contribute. Moreover, when it is 
possible for the donor to make income transfers to the recipient, the donor in this case can never 
do worse, but may do better by making such transfers, if the marginal rate of substitution 
between public and private consumption is large enough.  
  I now provide an explicit example where it is optimal for the donor not to contribute but 
make positive income transfers to the recipient who will then be the contributor. 
 
Example 1. Let ui = γlnxi + (1 - γ)G, 0 < γ < 1, i = 1, 2. It is easy to show that, for this class of 
utility functions, if the donor contributes, then x1 = γw1, and G = g1* = (1 - γ)w1. And the donor's 
utility is u1 = γlnγ + (1 - γ)ln(1 - γ) + lnw1.  
  If the donor does not contribute but transfers t ≥ 0 to the recipient, then G = g2* = (1 - 
γ)(w2 + t). And the donor's utility is u1(t) = γln(w1 - t) + (1 - γ)ln[(1 - γ)(w2 + t)]. The donor 
chooses t to maximize u1(t). The first-order condition is u1′(t) = - γ/(w1 - t) + (1 - γ)/(w2 + t) = 0. 
So, t* = (1 - γ)w1 - γw2 > 0 if and only if w1/w2 > γ/(1 - γ). It is easy to verify that the second-
order condition is also satisfied. The donor's utility can be shown to be u1(t*) = γlnγ + 2(1 - 
γ)ln(1 - γ) + ln(w1 + w2). Clearly, u1(t*) > u1 if and only if ln[(w1 + w2)/w1] > - (1 - γ)ln(1 - γ), or 
w1/w2 < 1/(χ - 1), where χ = 1/(1 - γ)
1- γ > 1.    
  In conclusion, if γ/(1 - γ) < w1/w2 < 1/(χ - 1), then the donor will not contribute but make 
a positive income transfer to the recipient who will then contribute to the best-shot public good.  
  Note that when γ → 0, χ → 1. Then, for all values of w1 and w2, it is optimal for the 
donor to make t* → w1, i.e., all its endowed income to the recipient. This result is independent of 
the relative magnitude of w1 and w2. When both the donor and the recipient derive utility from 
only public consumption, all incomes should be devoted to the provision of public good. Given 
the order of move by the two players and the nature of the best-shot public good, the donor 
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3. Conclusion 
 
This note points out the mistake in the analysis of the Stackelberg game by Jayaraman and 
Kanbur (1999) of the voluntary contribution to best-shot international public goods. It is assumed 
that both the donor and the recipient have identical preferences. The analysis can be easily 
extended to the case in which the two players have different preferences. The general conclusion 
is that, depending on the donor and recipient's preferences, the donor may choose not to 
contribute but make positive income transfers to the recipient who will then contribute to the 











Jayaraman, R., Kanbur, R., 1999. International public goods and the case for foreign aid. In  
Kaul, I., Grunberg, I., Stern, M. (Eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation  
in the 21
st Century. Oxford Univ. Press, New York, pp. 418-435. 
 